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FIRST AMENDMENT MARTYR, FIRST
AMENDMENT OPPORTUNIST:
COMMENTARY ON LARRY FLYNT'S ROLE
IN THE FREE SPEECH DEBATE*
RODNEY A. SMOLLA
Good afternoon and thanks for staying. I'll begin with a
little story. If you watch the movie The People vs. Larry Flynt,'
there's a fictional scene in the movie that I want to use as my
theme. Larry Flynt is played by Woody Harrelson, as you may
remember if you've seen the movie, and Larry Flynt's lawyer, Alan
Isaacman, is played by Ed Norton - two very good performances.
And in actual life, of course, it was very difficult to be Larry Flynt's
lawyer. If you were Alan Isaacman, you were always dealing with
the over-the-top outrageousness and behaviors of your own client
making your efforts to defend your client and keep him out of jail
and to keep him from paying money damages all the more difficult.
There's a moment in which the exasperated and almost
depressed Alan Isaacman is in despair. Larry Flynt is at the top of
his private jet, the very jet you just heard referred to, and he looks
down at his lawyer. He wants to buoy him up a little bit, and he
says: "Alan don't be so melodramatic. You don't want to quit me.
I'm your dream client. I'm the most fun. I'm rich, and I'm always in
trouble." 2
0 Rodney Smolla
* Rodney Smolla is president of Furman University and author of Jerry Falwell
v. Larry Flynt: The First Amendment on Trial. He spoke Feb. 19, 2010, as the
academic keynote of the First Amendment Law Review's symposium on
sexually explicit speech and the First Amendment. At the time of his address,
Smolla was the dean of the Washington & Lee University School of Law. This
is an edited reproduction of his comments.
1. THE PEOPLE VS. LARRY FLYNT (Columbia Pictures 1996).
2. Id.
Now, I know that Larry Flynt never said that to Alan
Isaacman. The reason I know that is I know who really wrote those
words. I did. When I wrote a book about the case Mr. Flynt was just
talking about, I was recounting how hard it was to be Flynt's
lawyer. Recounting some of the frustrating moments he had. And I
said, "Larry Flynt is a defense lawyer's dream: wealthy and always
in trouble."3 I at least have the solace of knowing that Oliver Stone
and Milos Forman felt good enough about the book I wrote to steal
at least one line.
But it is interesting, if you think about it. It is interesting that
here we are at one of the country's great universities. We're at a law
school. This is a learned environment, and one would think a
civilized environment. You're going to have a symposium about
very serious issues, about some of the central defining questions in
our constitutional experience. You invite, of all people, as a lead off
speaker of all people, Larry Flynt to this campus. He packs them in.
Not only does he pack them in. He makes the headline, above the
jump, of The Daily Tar Heel, big picture.4 Although the journalism
here is accurate, reasonably balanced, there is a quality of hero
worship to Larry Flynt. I saw it just now watching you. You all
thought he was funny. You're enjoying his wit. You're enjoying his
charm, and you're enjoying his humanity.
There's a kind of simplistic story here. The story is: He is an
outrageous guy, and he engages in speech that is offensive to
mainstream sensibilities. For that he gets hammered by the
government and by people like Jerry Falwell who don't want views
that they disagree with to have freedom in this country. Therefore,
he's a martyr for civil liberties and freedom of speech, and it's
worth the University of North Carolina's First Amendment Law
Review paying tribute to that martyrdom because that, as Larry
3. RODNEY A. SMOLLA, JERRY FALWELL v. LARRY FLYNT: THE FIRST
AMENDMENT ON TRIAL 28 (St. Martin's Press 1st ed. 1988).
4. Katy Charles, Porn King Flynt States His Case, DAILY TAR HEEL
(Chapel Hill, N.C.), Feb. 19, 2010, at 1, available at http://www.dailytarheel
.com/index.php/index.phplarticle/2010/02/hustlerslarry-flynt-defendsfirst_a
mendmentin unc speech (presenting the same article as the hardcopy
version but under a different headline which that reads "Hustler's Larry Flynt
Defends First Amendment in UNC Speech").
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Flynt just articulated, is the core free speech principle. You've got
to protect even that speech, in the words of Oliver Wendell
Holmes, "that [you] loathe and believe to be fraught with death."'
So I thought it would be fun to be - I guess if I was Flynt's
lawyer I'd be the devil's advocate - I'll be the opposite of that and
try to unpack a little bit of this and explore it with you. I want to
talk first of all about why it is Flynt and Hustler magazine and his
empire receive any First Amendment protection. It's interesting,
you heard a little bit of it here, and it's also in the paper here. I
underlined it. The paper says Flynt "didn't even know the First
Amendment applied to him when he began working in adult
entertainment." 6 So I want to talk a little about that. I want to talk
some about who the First Amendment applies to and then about
what it is that it applies to. The who and the what.
Let's talk first about the who. Not the Super Bowl halftime
show. The who in terms of speaker identity. One of the legacies of
many of Larry Flynt's First Amendment battles is a kind of
democratizing doctrine that currently exists in First Amendment
law in which there's a fair amount of hostility, particularly from the
Supreme Court of the United States, in drawing distinctions based
on the identities of speakers. Although this symposium has been
largely about Flynt's sexual speech, his career as a pornographer,
and to some degree his attack speech, his attack on Reverend
Falwell in the parody in which he humorously described Falwell as
having sex with his mother in an outhouse, in fact precisely
because Flynt is rich and always in trouble, he's had many, many
different kinds of intersections with modern First Amendment
doctrine.
He's partly the martyr that he portrays himself to be and
that, perhaps to some degree, is because he's rich enough to fight
these battles. So, for example, he is one of the people who has
litigated to the hilt the whole question of confidential sources
5. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
6. Charles, supra note 4.
7. See SMOLLA, supra note 3, at app. I (providing a reproduction of the
Hustler advertisement).
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because he often gets dirt on people by paying lots of money to get
it and then exposing people that he thinks are hypocritical. He's
often in a situation where some tribunal wants to know who it was
that gave him the material that led to the story. One of the great
showdowns was a case in which he received undercover tapes of a
drug sting of a famous auto manufacturer, Mr. DeLorean, and as
you may remember if you saw the movie, under pain of contempt
refuses to reveal the source.
He's also been a kind champion of the idea of press rights,
of the special rights of journalists, in an area of First Amendment
law known as the access cases.9 These are cases that test the
proposition: Do journalists have some right - different in kind
from others - to have access to institutions, to news events, to
theaters of war, etc.? Larry Flynt brought a suit against the
Department of Defense to contest those rules that prevented
journalists from having access to the field of battle; this particular
case involved the invasion of Grenada. 0
As Flynt himself suggested in his remarks, there are sort of
two levels to this question. The first is: Do we want a First
Amendment doctrine that recognizes formal rights on behalf of
certain speakers that are different in kind from those others enjoy?
The two classic examples being journalists and academics: These
have been the two great battlefields in modern times. Do professors
8. Id. at 42.
9. See generally Flynt v. Rumsfeld, 245 F. Supp. 2d 94 (D.D.C.. 2003)
(dismissing a First Amendment-based challenge to the military's "embedding"
program for journalists), aff'd on other grounds, 355 F.3d 697 (D.C. Cir. 2004);
Flynt v. Weinberger, 762 F.2d 134 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (finding the
challenge to the United States' decision "to prohibit press coverage of the
initial stages of the United States military intervention in Grenada" moot). In
both cases, Flynt sued the Department of Defense over restrictions on press
access to military operations. See Rumsfeld, 245 F. Supp. 2d at 96-97;
Weinberger, 762 F.2d at 134-35. In Rumsfeld, he was seeking a declaration that
the embedding program, which allowed journalists to accompany soldiers in
the field with some restrictions, was unconstitutional as applied to Hustler
because journalists for that magazine were denied a place in the program. See
Rumsfeld, 245 F. Supp. 2d at 96-97. In Weinberger he sought declaratory and
injunctive relief relating to the U.S. military's press ban during the initial
invasion of Grenada. See Weinberger, 762 F.2d at 134.
10. See Weinberger, 762 F.2d 134.
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have rights different in kind from others? Do journalists have rights
different in kind from others? Do media entities, like Hustler
magazine or The New York Times Company, have rights different
in kind from others? Do corporations called Duke or UNC, do
universities have rights different in kind from other speakers?
Flynt's been very much involved in those.
Then there is a second tier to the question, which is: Even if
you were going to posit that there is a reporter's privilege to protect
confidential sources or some right of access that journalists have to
cover a war, would Larry Flynt count? Would Hustler count? Is it a
member of the media? He talked, and I'm sure he gets great
satisfaction out of this; I know that he does because I've been at a
few other events with him over the years. He talks quite gleefully
about the fact that when the case involving Jerry Falwell was at the
court of appeals level" - it was the Fourth Circuit actually, not the
Fifth Circuit as he suggests, but he's not a lawyer and who cares
other than lawyers what number the court is - he talks about the
fact that he fought that alone, originally, when that case was
originally litigated in Roanoke and then litigated in the Fourth
Circuit. But once the Fourth Circuit judgment affirming the verdict
of $200,000 for infliction of emotional distress took place, suddenly
other media speakers decided they would align themselves with Mr.
Flynt and Hustler magazine.12
I was one of those folks back in those days. I actually wrote
one of those briefs that he, kind of ambivalently, kind of smugly,
talked about. I wrote a brief on behalf of The New York Times, The
Los Angeles Times, and a number of other speakers as amici in the
case. Indeed there were many friends of the Court as that case
wound itself up to the U.S. Supreme Court, making the same point
11. See generally Falwell v. Flynt, 797 F.2d 1270 (4th Cir. 1986) (affirming
the finding for Falwell on an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim
and against Falwell on a libel claim), rev'd sub nom. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v.
Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
12. See Hustler, 485 U.S. at 47 (noting that amicus briefs urging reversal
were filed by the American Civil Liberties Union, the Association of
American Editorial Cartoonists, the Association of American Publishers, the
Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, and by Richmond
Newspapers, Inc., among others).
2010] 5
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that Mr. Flynt made quite well, which is: if you allow famous people
to sue for hurt feelings because of satire or parodies of them, then
you make it impossible for Saturday Night Live to do its business,
for Gary Trudeau to do his business, for the long history of political
cartooning and lampooning that is part of our society to go forward.
And that was the argument that persuaded the Court unanimously,
including Chief Justice Rehnquist.13
As you might think, I think there is a lot more complexity to
this. Fascinatingly, there is a kind of double-edged sword to this
because it is true that First Amendment doctrine today has evolved.
It has actually evolved even more radically in the years since Flynt
was involved, to insist that we, for the most part, will not
countenance distinctions based on the identity of speakers. That's
good news in a sense for the egalitarian instincts that we have as
Americans, the idea that all of our speech is created equal. It's
actually ambivalent though in some respects from the perspective
of the mainstream media.
For example, the Supreme Court of the United States has,
in my view, rejected the notion that the press as an institution
enjoys any First Amendment protections over and above those of
ordinary citizens. There is a battle that is ongoing over the right of
reporters to keep their sources confidential. There was a brief
period in which there was a fair amount of momentum for the
notion that there might be a First Amendment privilege that
protected journalists. The Supreme Court decided a case,
Branzburg v. Hayes,14 quite a famous case, many of you have
probably read it, in which it appeared that by a 5-4 vote the Court
rejected the idea of a journalist's privilege, over the dissent of
Justice Potter Stewart," one of the justices that has gotten a lot of
attention today for his famous pithy remark about obscenity. 16
13. See id.
14. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
15. Id. at 725-52 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
16. In trying to define what material falls into the unprotected category
of obscenity, Stewart said of hardcore pornography:
I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of
material I understand to be embraced within that
shorthand description; and perhaps I could never succeed
6 [Vol. 9
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But in a magnificent bit of First Amendment lawyering by
very able media lawyers, that ostensible loss for the press was spun
into a temporary victory at least, focusing on a concurring opinion
written by Justice Lewis Powell - a very cryptic, short, three or
four paragraph opinion that some were able to massage into the
notion that journalists do enjoy a qualified First Amendment
privilege against the revelation of their sources. But, in more recent
times that view has lost its momentum, and if anything all of the law
is now moving in the opposite direction as a matter of First
Amendment doctrine. A very impressive piece of writing by
Seventh Circuit Judge Richard Posner, a very famous American
conservative intellectual from the University of Chicago, blasted
the idea that the Powell concurrence stood for the proposition that
there was a special journalists' privilege.' And, most famously in
recent times, the controversy over Valarie Plame, Scooter Libby
and Judith Miller, and her confidential sources for The New York
Times, resulted in the rejection of any journalists' privilege in the
in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it, and the
motion picture involved in this case is not that.
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1963) (Stewart, J., concurring).
17. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 709-10 (Powell, J., concurring).
18. See McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530, 533 (7th Cir. 2003). McKevitt
arose out of a criminal prosecution in Ireland. Id. at 531. The defendant was
seeking access to tapes of interviews that biographers in the United States had
conducted with David Rupert, who was expected to be the key witness against
the defendant in the trial. Id. Notably, Rupert did not object to the tape
recordings of the interviews being turned over, but the biographers asserted a
journalist's privilege argument to withhold them. Id. Justice Posner wrote:
Some cases that recognize a reporter's privilege suggest
that it can sometimes shield information in a reporter's
possession that comes from a nonconfidential source . ...
The cases that extend the privilege to nonconfidential
sources express concern with harassment, burden, using
the press as an investigative arm of government, and so
forth; see the Gonzalez, LaRouche, and Cuthbertson
opinions. Since these considerations were rejected by
Branzburg even in the context of a confidential source,
these courts may be skating on thin ice.
Id. at 532-33 (citations omitted).
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D.C. Court of Appeals." And, not withstanding the fact that two
well known American advocates - Ted Olson on the conservative
side and Floyd Abrams on the liberal side - joined together to try
to get that reversed, the Supreme Court didn't even accept review
of the case.20
I'll share with you a little anecdote, and I'm going to come
back to this in a minute. It happens that Justice Powell went to the
Washington & Lee Law School and the law school has his papers.
Although deans don't have much time to do any research, I actually
wandered down one day to rummage through the papers a little bit.
They were intriguing to me. I found the papers from Branzburg v.
Hayes. I meant to bring them except some personal circumstances
kept me from looping back to the law school where I had my file on
the desk for this symposium. I can't bring my show-and-tell for you,
but if you doubt my word, send me an email and I'll send it to you
in PDF. I have the score sheet that Justice Powell kept in the
chambers. It was a simpler day. He had a grid that he kept for every
case and it had all nine justices, a little box with each justice's name,
and then he'd write in his own handwriting a little comment. So you
can follow the score sheet to Branzburg v. Hayes. There are four
justices that voted to affirm and four justices that voted to reverse
and then you look in the Powell box and it says, in his own
handwriting, clear as can be: "Affirm, as I do not think there is a
const. privilege."2 ' He joined the majority opinion. He just wrote
separately to reflect.
The Supreme Court, every time it has commented on the
issue and has described Branzburg v. Hayes, which it has never
done in much depth - it does it in a throw away sentence, a
parenthetical at the end of a citation - whenever it's gone back it's
referred to its own decision as rejecting the idea of a reporter's
privilege. It's similarly rejected the idea of any academic freedom
right or academic freedom privilege that inures either to
19. See In re Miller, 397 F.3d 964, 965 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
20. Miller v. United States, 545 U.S. 1150, 1150 (2005) (denying petition
for writ of certiorari).
21. Papers from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Supreme Court Case File
No. 70-85 (argued Feb. 23, 1972) (on file with First Amendment Law Review
and Washington & Lee University School of Law).
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universities or to individuals within the universities - students at a
state university like the University of North Carolina or faculty
members here. Although they surely enjoy robust First
Amendment freedoms, and although the Court often uses the
phrase "academic freedom,"2 2 it really uses it in the same way you
and I would use the phrase "artistic freedom." It doesn't mean it as
a load-bearing independent doctrine. In one of the most significant
cases, a case involving the University of Pennsylvania, in which the
Supreme Court refused to give the University of Pennsylvania the
equivalent of a reporter's privilege, this was a privilege to keep
from others the tenure files of someone at the University of
Pennsylvania, the Supreme Court said: There's no special First
Amendment academic freedom privilege, just like there's no special
journalist's privilege.23
The most recent example of this is the Citizens United
case,24 the case that has gathered so much controversy in the last
several weeks involving the Hillary movie and the decision by the
Supreme Court that it is unconstitutional to prevent corporations
from engaging in political speech for or against a candidate for
public office. One of the sleeper issues in that case is that the Court
found as one of the most significant rationales the idea that to
recognize the constitutionality of those restrictions required it to
accept as legitimate under First Amendment law a distinction
25between media and non-media companies. That unwillingness to
recognize that it was appropriate to have two First Amendment
standards - one that applied to media companies and one that
applied to non-media companies - was one of the animating
impulses behind Justice Kennedy's majority opinion.
22. See, e.g., Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006) (repeatedly using
the phrase "academic freedom"); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003)
(using the phrase "academic freedom" four times throughout the majority
opinion and dissent).
23. Univ. of Penn. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, 493 U.S.
182, 201 (1990) (citing Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972)).
24. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. _, 130 S. Ct. 876
(2010).
25. Id. at , 130 S.Ct. at 906.
2010] 9
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I bring all of this up just to show you the kind of fascinating,
almost ironic, complexity of this. It really is fair to say that Larry
Flynt's crusades were very powerful in bringing into First
Amendment doctrine the notion that we're all in this together. I
have the same First Amendment rights as The New York Times, at
least in terms of the identity of the speaker. Fascinatingly, the other
side of that coin appears to be that those rights will only be the
default rights that we all enjoy. We will not accept as part of First
Amendment doctrine the idea that there are media speakers,
whatever that may mean, that enjoy greater rights. I should say, it's
one of the themes I've listened to throughout the day; the Internet
has had a powerful impact on that. We talked a lot about the impact
of the Internet on our underlying conceptions of what speech is
protected and not protected and evolving standards of obscenity. It
has also been one of the forces that has caused the Court to not be
willing to identify special rights for journalists. You see this in the
Citizens United case. You see it in a number of other recent
decisions. It's because it is no longer possible to speak as coherently
as we used to speak about what a journalist is or is not. The very
fact that in some sense we could all be journalists, we could all have
futures like Larry Flynt, I suppose, if you wanted, has made the
Court reluctant to draw doctrinal lines in that direction.
Lastly, before I get on to the content issues here, money
matters a lot. Of course, money is what the Citizens United case is
all about. For those that think the Supreme Court got it wrong,
what they fear is the potential corrupting influence of large
aggregations of money, often other people's money, the money of
shareholders brought to bear to influence the political process.
When Larry Flynt says that when he first started out here that he
didn't think of this as a First Amendment enterprise, he's being
absolutely truthful. He thought of this as a money-making
enterprise. There's no question about that. I got to know a lot about
him writing the book. He and Jerry Falwell both are very, very
interesting characters, and have a lot more in common than you
might think. I mean that, actually, in a complimentary way. They're
both extraordinary marketers. They're both in a certain way
extraordinary entrepreneurs.
One of Larry Flynt's insights was that being at the bottom
can sell. One of his crusades was to attack what he thought was
hypocritically fancy pornographic material. It's no accident his
arch-enemies were people like Bob Guccione, the publisher of
Penthouse magazine, even Playboy, and that they hated him too. To
them, Larry Flynt was giving obscenity a bad name because he
basically said: I'm just selling sex. I don't need articles by Norman
Mailer. I don't need stuff about surround sound stereo systems.
You know, I'm just here to actually sell the sex, pure and simple,
and to deliver it. If you look at his life, he simply moved from
running strip clubs, and basically prostitution rings, into mass-
marketing through Hustler magazine. It was all selling that and
making money.
Now, I'm going to switch to the content side and try to link
some of the things I've just talked about. We've heard a lot of talk
today about the First Amendment perspective on the issues we've
been describing. My friend and colleague Dean [Katharine] Bartlett
did a wonderful job in describing that. I think - it's helpful though,
in light of many of the comments we heard - Professor [William]
Van Alstyne's description of Mein Kampf, Larry Flynt's own
description of the connection to the Holocaust, what many of the
other commentators have talked about - to roll the free speech
clock back a bit and to realize that there's at least two very solid,
very quintessentially American, and very defensible conceptions
about what freedom of speech is - not just who qualifies, but what
qualifies - that have long been in tension and continue to be in
tension in our society in my view.
The particular case I'm going to pick out for this - a case
almost all of you have read, all of you who are law students have
read - Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire.26 In my view, if you had to
read two cases ever in the free speech tradition, you could read
Chaplinsky on the one hand, in fact you could read one paragraph,
you all know the one I'm going to be talking about, and maybe the
dissenting opinion of Oliver Wendell Holmes in Abrams v. United
27States. You don't really need to read the other 700 cases, alright.
26. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
27. 250 U.S. 616, 624-31 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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In some ways, it's an epic battle between the thoughts in those two
very famous paragraphs, both of which are very powerful.
Let me remind you of that famous passage in Chaplinsky.
The sentence you're most likely to remember is the one that says
there are several narrow categories of speech, the proscription of
"which ha[s] never been thought to raise any Constitutional
problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the
libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting words' - those which by
their very utterance inflict injury,"2 8 and so on. That sort of
statement of the categories in Chaplinsky of unprotected speech,
particularly that phrase "fighting words," most of us had to
remember when we took our constitutional law course. I took my
course with Professor Van Alstyne and I remember writing down
"fighting words." It's really the next sentence that you should
remember. The next sentence, in one sentence, brilliantly captures
a very powerful conception, one conception, of what free speech
should mean.29 We might call it the European conception today.
We've talked a lot about Europe's approach to freedom of speech.
In some ways it perfectly encapsulates that, probably encapsulates
what most of the rest of the world, except the United States, thinks
of freedom of speech.
The Court then gives you the philosophical underpinnings
for why it is those other categories are not protected. It says: These
contribute virtually nothing to the marketplace of ideas. They add
very little to public discourse. There's not any ideas in them and
whatever ideas might be there, the harm they cause, the damage
they do to morality and order far outweighs any plausible benefit
they might have.30 So the Court is basically saying that to be
protected under the First Amendment, there is a kind of affirmative
element and negative element. The affirmative element is: you've
got to show us something worthy of protection. You've at least got
28. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72 (citations omitted).
29. "It has been well observed that such utterances are no essential part
of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth
that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the
social interest in order and morality." Id. at 572 (citing ZECHARIAH CHAFEE,
FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 50 (Harvard Univ. Press 1941)).
30. See Chaplinksy at 572.
12 [Vol. 9
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to show us an idea. You've got to at least show us you're
contributing something to the project of discourse, to the project of
debate, to the enlightenment of society. Secondly, it's saying: Even
if you can get past that, which is the minimum to even qualify, there
is going to be some speech that we're just certain as a society has
got such low marks in terms of its contribution, but such high marks
in terms of the damage, we're confident it does, that we can justify
its abridgement. The Court says, here are some of the classic
examples: libel is an example, obscenity is an example, and fighting
words are an example. I doubt when the law clerk or Justice
[Frank] Murphy wrote that, they meant that to be the full list; it
became the Chaplinsky list. I doubt that was the project at the time.
I think it was more evocative. These are the kinds of things, they
don't add much, but they sure as heck cause a lot of damage,
therefore a decent society will be able to proscribe them.
That notion is in tension, if you will, it's in powerful tension
with the libertarian vision of the First Amendment, the Larry Flynt
vision. It's in tension on both levels. Larry Flynt, I think, would say:
"Who is to say whether there is some contribution to the world of
ideas? Who is telling me this is not a contribution?" And then he'd
say: "And who's got any real proof that it's hurting anybody? Who
could show me that it damages children? Who could show me that
it causes divorces? Who could show me that it contributes to rape?"
So to pick up the very nice visual case that I think Larry Walters in
the earlier panel did, here you have today's paper. Here you have
Larry Flynt up here.31 And here you have the sexual assault issue
that UNC and half the campuses in the country are struggling
with.3 2 The fact that sexual assault is vastly unreported on a lot of
American campuses. What Larry Flynt says is: "You show me the
proof that this story really connects with that story. You show me
that there's really some cause and effect. If you can't show me that,
then I deserve First Amendment protection because you haven't
made the rigorous case that the First Amendment requires."
31. See Charles, supra note 4.
32. See Charlotte Lindemanis, Sexual Assault Often Untold: Rape Often
Not Reported at UNC, DAILY TAR HEEL (Chapel Hill, N.C.), Feb. 19, 2010, at
1.
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I want to unpack that a little more, and unpack it by getting
into one of the issues that I heard talked about a lot today. You
take the Chaplinsky view and take, lets say, the Holmes
marketplace view, it's very interesting that on both the affirmative
side and the negative side, the Chaplinsky conception of freedom of
speech is thinking about freedom of speech as part of a societal
good, as part of a communal, community good. The whole idea is
we protect freedom of speech because it's good for us as a people.
It's good for us as a democracy. It's good for us as a society. If what
you're saying can't be connected in some way to society, to
civilization, then it doesn't deserve any special protection because it
is not doing us as a collective any good. Then the negative side is
very much the same, and when we can see through our democratic
processes that it does a lot of rupture to society, that it's hurting us
in some very serious way, that collective decision that it's damaging
us will trump at least a modest amount of contribution.
You think of the Holmes view and the Larry Flynt position
that has really reached ascendancy to a large degree in a whole
basketful of cases in the Supreme Court. The claim for protection
of freedom of speech has nothing to do with what's the communal
good. What did we hear a lot about during the afternoon? You
don't have to watch it. But if I want to make it and some people
want to watch it, those people ought to be able to do it. They ought
to be able to see it. So it's really thinking of speech's value entirely
of the individual person. In fact, the rhetoric of First Amendment
groups is entirely tied to individual rights; the right of the individual
to see it, the right of the individual to produce it. There's no
attempt to discuss it as a collective value. Then on the harm side,
going back to John Stuart Mill, and the strong libertarian civil
liberties tradition out of which modern First Amendment law rose,
the notion is that society can't play that trump card without very
strong evidence showing a nexus between the harm it is claiming
and the speech. In the incitement case, and the threat cases, and
violence cases, and most of the cases we talk about in modern First
Amendment doctrine, what the doctrines demand is a tightness in
that connection.
Now, Chaplinsky is not entirely dead. I want to compare for
you two strains of First Amendment law that both come from the
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Chaplinsky philosophy and compare how they each have fared.
One involves hate speech - so, racist, homophobic, religious
attacking speech, in which groups are attacked based on a group's
or individual's identity. The other is sexually explicit speech,
obscene speech. It is no accident, it is quite interesting, that
throughout the day we heard those two sometimes interwoven and
talked about together.
The first great hate speech case decided by the Supreme
Court doesn't even make it into most constitutional law case books
anymore. It's a shame that it doesn't because it is maybe the most
eloquent discussion of the Chaplinsky theory. It's a case called
Beauharnais v. Illinois,33 probably now overruled. It's a 1952
decision involving an Illinois hate speech law. Illinois made it a
crime to disparage groups on the basis of racial identity. A racist
group in Chicago, my hometown, was distributing racist leaflets
attacking African Americans.
The leader, a guy named Beauharnais, is prosecuted and
found guilty. He asks for a libertarian instruction. He asks for the
jury to be instructed: Before I can go to jail for my racist leaflets,
the state of Illinois should have to prove that my speech posed a
clear and present danger to the eruption of violence against African
Americans. The Illinois Supreme Court said: No, you're not
entitled to that instruction, relying on Chaplinsky.3 4 The Supreme
Court of the United States affirmed, relying on Chaplinsky. In an
opinion written by Justice Felix Frankfurter, the only Jewish
member of the Court at the time, he refers to the events, the recent
events - World War II and the Holocaust - and he says Illinois is
entitled to make the judgment that this kind of racist speech
corrodes the social fabric and leads to the kind of derailing of our
society that recent events have taught us about.3 ' That this is speech
that is especially corrosive of the idea of a society. It is an eloquent
restatement of the theory of Chaplinsky, as applied to hate speech.
The fascinating thing about Beauharnais is that there is no
33. 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
34. See People v. Beauharnais, 97 N.E.2d 343, 346-47 (Ill. 1951), affd sub
nom. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
35. See Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 258.
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requirement of a causal connection and no requirement of proof.
The intuition, the democratic assessment that this stuff does not
contribute much to the marketplace of ideas, this is just mean, evil,
attacking racism. But it sure as heck can cause trouble and harm.
We may not be able to prove that this speech caused this lynching,
or this beating on this day, but we have this overall sense that rings
true that this stuff can really damage us as a society, and damage
our notion of community and damage our morality and order.
Now Beauharnais basically gets overruled. The Supreme
Court, like often happens, has never written the words
"Beauharnais has been overruled," but I can list you nine cases and
put them on the exam if you want, that have got to stand for the
proposition that it's no longer good law. Brandenburg v. Ohio," the
famous Ku Klux Klan case, requires a very high level of proof of
incitement today, the very opposite of Beauharnais.37 A case that I
argued in the Supreme Court of the United States, Virginia v.
Black,18 involving a cross burning, carries the same sort of notions.
You've got to demonstrate there's a true threat.3 9 We could go on
and on. Flag burning cases. Truthfully, the Falwell v. Flynt40 case.
The mere capacity of speech to upset our sensibility, our sense of
morality and decency, isn't enough to justify its abridgement. So
that libertarian view has trumped in the main.
Fascinatingly, though, the one hold out in our legal doctrine
is Miller v. California41 and its progeny. Whatever the realities of
36. 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
37. Id. at 447 (noting that "the constitutional guarantees of free speech
and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use
of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting
or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such
action").
38. 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
39. Id. at 359 (citing Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969)) ('True
threats' encompass those statements where the speaker means to
communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful
violence to a particular individual or group of individuals.").
40. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
41. 413 U.S. 15 (1973). In Miller, the Court laid out a three-prong test to
determine if a work is obscene:
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modern obscenity prosecutions may be, whatever the realities of
the huge engine of money it produces, the extent to which
Americans may access it and so on, in our formal law Miller is a
direct linear descendant of the theory of Chaplinsky. Chaplinsky
was relied upon by the Court in Roth v. United States,42 the case that
said obscene speech does not get protection in the First
Amendment. 43 And Miller, of course, relies on Roth." And if you
think about it, for many of the reasons many of the other panelists
have talked about, it makes perfect Chaplinsky logic.
To the extent that what Larry Flynt or others are selling is
sexual conduct of a sort, the part that goes to the part of the brain
that Professor Van Alystne was talking about,45 to the extent that's
(a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary
community standards" would find that the work, taken as
a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the
work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way,
sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state
law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
Id. at 24 (citation omitted).
42. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
43. Id. at 492.
44. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 19 n.2 (noting "that the words 'obscene
material,' as used in this case, have a specific judicial meaning which derives
from the Roth case").
45. Professor William Van Alstyne, during a comparison of European
and American approaches to free speech, provided the following explanation
of pornography:
It does not hit the frontal lobes. Part of the definition of
pornography in a technical sense, is that you feel. It is
meant to bypass the critical centers up here and it goes
directly to the hypothalamus. The true function of
operational pornography and obscenity is more like a pill
that you ingest, that is meant to trigger, autonomically,
certain physiological responses. It may increase pulse rate,
heightened blood flow and a variety of other things.
You've seen it all on the advertisements.
William Van Alstyne, Lee Professor of Law, William and Mary Law School,
Address at the First Amendment Law Review Annual Symposium: Sexually
Explicit Speech and the First Amendment (Feb. 19, 2010), available at
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what's being packaged and sold, it's not an idea in the view of
Miller v. California. It's not contributing to the marketplace of
ideas. Without proof, without clarity in the social science evidence,
just the intuition that it can't be good, that it's probably hurting
children, it probably creates bad attitudes toward sexuality, it
probably contributes to sexual aggression, or at least it could - well,
that is all it takes under Chaplinsky, given that conception of
freedom of speech. The whole notion in the Roth-Miller line of
cases, that we do not declare something obscene if there is
redeeming social value, is designed as the free speech safety valve
for telling us this isn't the stuff that falls within the first prong of
Chaplinsky, in which there is no contribution to the marketplace of
ideas. This is actually art. This is actually literature.
It's of course one of the fascinating elements of the free
speech story that the most significant and notorious early day
prosecutions for obscenity involved things that to us as moderns, it
was only seventy or eighty years ago, but to us seem unthinkable.
The idea that one book named Ulysses could be declared obscene.
The idea that a book by D.H. Lawrence could be declared obscene.
That's good for Larry Flynt's side. You heard him say: If you can
burn Hustler, it doesn't take long before you can burn Lady
Chatterly's Lover or Ulysses. That's his core argument. There are no
tools that allow you to distinguish between the two.
I'm going to end by talking about the one place in American
life where I think Chaplinsky and Holmes are still fighting an even
fight. Neither side has been able to win, for good reason actually. I
kind of like the evenness of the battle. It's like I like a good, close
UNC-Duke basketball game. Who wants a twenty point blowout?
Give me that overtime. What is it? It's the American university. I
talked a little earlier about academic freedom as a cousin of press
freedom and so on. If you think about it, you're on a great campus
like this, there is a part of our lives that is organized around
Chaplinsky principles, and there is a part of our lives that is
organized around marketplace of ideas principles. Of course, on a





of ideas. We think of it as a place where students have freedom of
speech and academic freedom and professors do. All ideas are open
game, and we'll even invite Larry Flynt to a campus and you can't
kick him out. He's got a right to his views too. In that sense we are
super-marketplace imbibers on the American campus. It's part of
the scientific method. It's part of the tradition of the liberal arts. It's
part of the tradition of debate in law schools, et cetera.
In another interesting way, we have a kind of confidence in
our ability to decide whether something is or is not speech worthy
of credit within an academic environment and whether it does or
does not on the negative side cause some disruption that we think is
not worth a candle in terms of its credit. Part of that is because
we're in the free speech business all the time. We judge speech all
the time. We admit students based on their essays. We hire faculty
based on the content of their materials. We make decisions to deny
tenure or grant tenure based on content. We grade exams based on
the lucidity of what the student says. We can't operate, we're
incoherent, if we can't make judgments about professional quality.
Now what we say is - and I think most of us believe this - is that
we're not penalizing you on viewpoint alone. So we wouldn't refuse
to hire a professor or tenure a professor purely because of their
views one way or the other on Roe v. Wade.46 We wouldn't grade
two constitutional law exams differently because one student
agreed with our view of gun control and the Heller47 case and
another student had a different view. But we do have this sense that
we're able to separate those viewpoint judgments from qualitative
judgments as to what is worthy or not worthy of credit.
Even beyond that, we have other norms of civilization and
community building. So one of the reasons that, although we have
to be careful exactly about how they are phrased and how they are
worded and what the content is, we generally rule out of bounds -
in many settings on a campus such as this -personal attack, hate
speech, the kinds of attacks that we think are not making a genuine
contribution in any intellectual way to some debate, but are in fact
an affront to our sense of morality and good order.
46. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
47. Dist. of Columbia. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
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Last little point - I promised you I'd talk about the
Internet at the very end - if you think about the basic doctrinal
structure of Miller v. California48 , there is a fascinating, almost
schizophrenia with regard to the concept of community. On the
redeeming value prong, the law, the current doctrine is, that it is not
judged by community standards.49 Chapel Hill is not allowed to
apply its view of what is redeeming serious value. Nor is Los
Angeles. That is a kind of concession to the marketplace of ideas
writ large and to the notion that we're one national marketplace
and we don't want localities picking and choosing about what
makes it as a minimal amount of free speech that will trigger the
protections of the First Amendment. But, of course, as we've also
heard, Professor Van Alystne talked about it, the official doctrine
from the Supreme Court of the United States at least, not
withstanding some interesting recent court of appeals decisions, the
official doctrine is that the community standards, in terms of what is
patently offensive, test is local.so
Now why would that be? I think it's because, even though
we heard fascinating debate today, it's almost impossible to
conceive of the second side of Chaplinsky, the affront to morality
and good order, without thinking of a community. You can't get
your arms around it without thinking in terms of a community. Our
communities are, for the most part, local. A university is one of the
few places in modern American life where there's still some sense
of community. I mean, you all think of yourselves as Tar Heels, a
lot of you, and you love Carolina Blue and you have a certain
loyalty. There's a feeling that it means something to be part of that
place. You're proud of that. There's a sense of cohesiveness and
values that wraps itself around it. There's probably more sense of
community to be a member of UNC campus than there is to be,
48. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
49. See Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 500-01 (1987) (rejecting the
argument that the value of a work prong of the Miller test should be judged
based on community standards and clarifying that the proper inquiry is based
on a "reasonable person" standard).
50. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 30 (1973) (affirming that "what appeals to the




even of Chapel Hill, not a giant area. The Internet has done a lot to
bust up locality and to break through the conceptions that we have
that identity is local. And to break through even the notion of a
local community and the idea that morality and order are even
something that we as a society can get ourselves around.
Now Larry Flynt is great at making money. The mainstream
media kind of came to his rescue by writing those beautiful amicus
briefs. You know: "Wow, we're in it with you, Larry." Now we're
the ones who need the bailout. It's a struggle for most of the cities
of this country to find a business model that will allow a local
newspaper to exist. That would be a great loss for American society
if they disappeared and all that we have are national mainstream
sort of Internet outlets because one of the things, whether you hate
your local newspaper or love your local newspaper, one of the
things it does is it forms community. It's a community former. It's a
place where there's a kind of cohesive identity, a sense of morality
and order, and so on, that extends just beyond the family itself. As
we're in a process in the evolution of our culture where those
community builders are dissolving, you see it in the pressures in
things like obscenity doctrine. But you see it overall in a kind of
overall pressure on that side of us that doesn't think Chaplinsky is
so horrible, that doesn't think it's necessarily bad to want to have
some norms of decency and order around which we organize
ourselves.
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